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eBook details
- Title: Therapeutic Potential of Transcendental Inquiry in the Husserlian Philosophy/Terapines Transcendentaliojo Tyrimo Galimybes Husserlio Filosofijoje (Report)
- Author : Coactivity
- Release Date : January 01, 2010
- Genre: Religion & Spirituality,Books,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 110 KB
Description
Introduction From the first formulation of the reformative program of philosophy in the Logical Investigations, phenomenology claimed to be science. From initial "misleading," as Edmund Husserl put it in 1913 Introduction to second edition of the book (Husserl 2001b: 6), formulation of phenomenology as "descriptive psychology" (Husserl 2001b: 175), through the idea of "rigorous science" (Husserl 1965: 71-147), up to the concept of the "first philosophy" (Husserl 1956), phenomenological philosophy aimed at being comprehended as science. Therefore, it is not surprising that "Husserl's entire philosophical work moves within the magnetic field of the concept of science" (Bernet et al. 1993: 13). Husserl, however, was not interested in the formulation of the general program of sciences, but he pointed at the exposition of genuine science in particular. Since, in Husserl's view, genuine science has to found all other sciences, whether philosophical or natural, in such a way that a phenomenologist shall be able to distinguish genuine from non-genuine knowledge precisely from the phenomenological viewpoint. To go one step further, such a clarification leads us to understand phenomenology as a kind of foundationalism, in which all truths seem to be derived from the fundamental truths (Drummond 1990: 239). Nonetheless, while giving attention to science, fundamental truths and suspending each subjective belief, the phenomenologist strives for an abstract level. By doing so, however, is not he in fact naive? After all, the phenomenologist seems to suspend questions which cannot be answered in an objective manner, and for this reason he suspends existential questions. Is this not the argument against the fundamental science which falls into the crisis?